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The important point is that this process of sovereign exclusion
and inclusion was not a one-shot affair, occurring some time in
the distant past when international law accepted the proposition
that indigenous territory constituted terra nullius. It is an ongo-
ing process of exclusion and inclusion to the extent that it
continues to subsume indigenous populations under the sover-
eign power of States not of their making.
-Patrick Macklem'
INTRODUCTION
In September of 2007, the United Nations General Assembly adopted
the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (the
Declaration).2 The Declaration is the product of more than twenty years of
negotiation, and passed overwhelmingly with just four nations dissenting
The Declaration affirms the legal existence of indigenous communi-
ties and sets minimum standards for their recognition, participation, and
1. Patrick Macklem, Essay, Indigenous Recognition in International Law: Theoretical
Observations, 30 MICH. J. INT'L L. 177, 186 (2008). Terra nullius is Latin for "territory
which belongs to no one." MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 342 (4th ed. 1997); see
also MICHAEL CONNOR, THE INVENTION OF TERRA NULLIUS: HISTORICAL AND LEGAL Fic-
TIONS ON THE FOUNDATION OF AUSTRALIA (2005).
Terra nullius is a concept that is also central to American property law. See, e.g., United
States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 572 (1846) ("[T]he whole continent was divided and
parcelled out, and granted by the governments of Europe as if it had been vacant and unoccu-
pied land ...."); Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 409 (1842) ("For
according to the principles of international law, as then understood by the civilized powers of
Europe, the Indian tribes in the new world were regarded as mere temporary occupants of the
soil, and the absolute rights of property and dominion were held to belong to the European
nation by which any particular portion of the country was first discovered. Whatever forbear-
ance may have been sometimes practised towards the unfortunate aborigines, either from
humanity or policy, yet the territory they occupied was disposed of by the governments of
Europe at their pleasure, as if it had been found without inhabitants."); Johnson v. M'Intosh,
21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 596 (1823) ("So far as respected the authority of the crown, no dis-
tinction was taken between vacant lands and lands occupied by the Indians.").
2. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Oct. 2, 2007) [hereinafter Declaration].
3. "The Declaration was adopted by an overwhelming majority of the General As-
sembly, with 143 countries voting in support, 4 voting against (Australia, Canada, New
Zealand and the United States) and 11 abstaining (Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burundi,
Colombia, Georgia, Kenya, Nigeria, Russian Federation, Samoa, Ukraine)." Press Release,
U.N. Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, Historic Milestone for Indigenous Peoples
Worldwide as United Nations Adopts Rights Declaration (Sept. 13, 2007), available at
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/Declaration-ip-pressrelease.pdf (last visited
Jan. 28, 2010).
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due process rights in domestic and international law.4 The Declaration,
however, is not binding.5 Its effect is limited to its ability to create "dif-
fuse legal consequences for the development of both international and
domestic law.' 6 The Declaration's efficacy is further limited by its failure
to specify concrete standards for states and other international actors.7
Article 28 of the Declaration8 addresses perhaps the most conten-
tious and persistent problem facing indigenous communities-land
rights.9 Article 28 provides guidance on remedies for governments that
create a functional process for recognizing indigenous communities and
remedying land disputes.'0 It reads:
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to redress, by means that
can include restitution or, when this is not possible, just, fair and
equitable compensation, for the lands, territories and resources
which they have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or
used, and which have been confiscated, taken, occupied, used or
damaged without their free, prior and informed consent.
4. See Robert T. Coulter, The U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples:
A Historic Change in International Law, 45 IDAHO L. REV. 539, 543 (2009); Macklem, supra
note 1, at 179. See generally Declaration, supra note 2.
5. Macklem, supra note 1, at 179; Coulter, supra note 4, at 546.
6. Macklem, supra note 1, at 179.
7. See, e.g., id. ("[T]he U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples [] spe-
cif[ies] no criteria for determining whether a community constitutes an indigenous people in
international law.").
8. Declaration, supra note 2, art. 28.
9. John Bern & Susan Dodds, On the Plurality of Interests: Aboriginal Self-
Government and Land Rights, in POLITICAL THEORY AND THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEO-
PLES, 163 (2008).
10. Article 27, by contrast, establishes how governments and indigenous communities
should settle land disputes. Article 27 declares:
States shall establish and implement, in conjunction with indigenous peoples con-
cemed, a fair, independent, impartial, open and transparent process, giving due
recognition to indigenous peoples' laws, traditions, customs and land tenure sys-
tems, to recognize and adjudicate the rights of indigenous peoples pertaining to
their lands, territories and resources, including those which were traditionally
owned or otherwise occupied or used. Indigenous peoples shall have the right to
participate in this process.
Declaration, supra note 2, art. 27 (emphasis added).
Whether a government complies with Article 27 depends entirely on the definition of
due recognition. Due recognition presents complex questions. Macklem, supra note 1, at 177.
What are the requirements of due recognition? Who decides when a government has provided
an indigenous community with enough recognition? Has any government, in the view of the
General Assembly, ever provided due recognition to an indigenous community? Until these
questions are answered, even well meaning governments will struggle to provide due recogni-
tion to indigenous communities that seek to return to their traditional lands.
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2. Unless otherwise freely agreed upon by the peoples con-
cemed, compensation shall take the form of lands, territories and
resources equal in quality, size and legal status or of monetary
compensation or other appropriate redress."
Just, fair and equitable compensation is an appropriate and laudable
goal, but it is also an extraordinarily flexible and vague standard that
leaves plenty of room for interpretation. Thus, while Article 28 is an es-
sential starting point for improving the land rights of indigenous
peoples,' 2 it is only a starting point. For indigenous peoples to realize
their land rights under international law, it is essential that the interna-
tional community clarify and strengthen Article 28 of the Declaration.
The purpose of this Note is two-fold: first, to demonstrate why the
standards set out in Article 28 require further clarification, and second, to
propose reforms (both inside and outside of the United Nations frame-
work) that might benefit indigenous peoples claiming land rights.
Part I explains, from a theoretical perspective, why Article 28 may
not fully benefit indigenous peoples during the litigation process. Draw-
ing on an analogy to Professor Marc Galanter's influential analysis of
long-run litigation outcomes, " Part I argues that land disputes between
governments and indigenous peoples are likely to be similar to disputes
between "repeat players" and "one-shotters. ' '4 The government plays the
role of a repeat player, and the indigenous peoples play the role of a one-
shotter. In other words, governments tend to hold a systematic advantage
over indigenous communities because governments "can anticipate legal
problems and can often structure transactions and compile a record to
justify their actions."'5 Thus, simply allowing courts to decide the mean-
ing of just, fair, and equitable compensation is likely to advantage the
government and to disadvantage indigenous peoples.
Part II explains the practical obstacles indigenous peoples confront
when seeking to obtain a just, fair, and equitable remedy--even if they
are successful in litigation. Part II reviews two cases where indigenous
peoples have successfully litigated their rights to their native lands. In
particular, Part II discusses the experiences of the Richtersveld commu-
nity in the South African courts and the Awas Tingni community in the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR). The South African
11. Declaration, supra note 2, art. 28 (emphasis added).
12. See Coulter, supra note 4, at 539-40 (noting that the Declaration brought about the
first change in the international law governing indigenous minorities).
13. See Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits
of Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'y REV. 95 (1974).
14. Id. at 97.
15. Joel B. Grossman et al., Do the "Haves" Still Come Out Ahead?, 33 LAW & SOC'Y
REV. 803, 803 (1999) (discussing the Galanter framework).
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experience is discussed with particular attention to the South African
Constitution, 16 the Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994,17 and the
Richtersveld Community case. 8 The experience of the Awas Tingni
community is discussed through reference to the IACtHR's decision in
Mayagna (Sumo) Community of Awas iingni v. Nicaragua'9 and the
American Convention on Human Rights. 0 Richtersveld and Awas Tingni
are landmark cases that serve as models for courts called on to decide
land claims brought by indigenous peoples. Part II illustrates, however,
that even the most laudable decisions can be difficult to implement.
Thus, even when indigenous communities are successful in the courts,
they require substantial assistance to actually obtain a just, fair, and equi-
table remedy.
Part III proposes several ways to help indigenous peoples break
through the repeat player/one-shotter paradigm in order to obtain a
meaningful remedy. First, The United Nations Permanent Forum on In-
digenous Issues (Permanent Forum) 2' or a similar body should be given
16. See generally Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996,
§ 25(7) ("A person or community dispossessed of property after 19 June 1913 as a result of
past racially discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an Act of
Parliament, either to restitution of that property or to equitable redress.").
17. Restitution of Land Rights Act, 22 of 1994 (S. Afr.).
18. Alexkor Ltd. v. Richtersveld Cmty., 2003 (12) BCLR 1301 (CC) (S. Afr.) [herein-
after Richtersveld 11]. This paper primarily discusses the ruling of the Constitutional Court of
South Africa (cited above) and will refer to the lower court rulings to provide context. The
lower court decisions provide an interesting study of the difficulties indigenous peoples often
face when attempting to present sufficient evidence and comply with procedural rules that
limit access to courts. See generally Richtersveld Cmty. v. Alexkor Ltd., 1999 (3) SA 1293
(LCC) (S. Afr.) (decision of the Land Claims Court) [hereinafter Richtersveld 1], rev'd Rich-
tersveld Cmty. v. Alexkor Ltd., 2003 (6) BCLR 583 (SCA) [hereinafter Richtersveld Il] (S.
Afr.).
19. Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
C) No. 79 (Aug. 31, 2001).
For an excellent discussion of the Awas Tingni decision, see Leonardo J. Alvarado,
Prospects and Challenges in the Implementation of Indigenous Peoples' Human Rights in
International Law: Lessons from the Case of Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua, 24 ARIZ. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 609 (2007); Jennifer A. Amiott, Environment, Equality, and Indigenous Peoples'
Land Rights in the Inter-American Human Rights System: Mayagna (Sumo) Indigenous
Community of Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua, 32 ENVTL. L. 873 (2002); S. James Anaya & Clau-
dio Grossman, The Case of Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua: A New Step in the International Law of
Indigenous Peoples, 19 ARiz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1 (2002).
20. Organization of American States [OAS], American Convention on Human Rights,
Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144, U.N.T.S. 123. For an excellent discussion of the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), and Inter-American system in general, see
Cecilia Medina, The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights: Reflections on a Joint Venture, 12 HUM. RTS. Q. 439 (1990).
21. "The UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues is an advisory body to the Eco-
nomic and Social Council [ECOSOC], with a mandate to discuss indigenous issues related to
economic and social development, culture, the environment, education, health and human
Winter 2010]
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responsibility for researching and analyzing whether various nations are
living up to the letter and intent of the Declaration.22 The Permanent Fo-
rum should publish its findings in a form that allows governments and
indigenous peoples to compare the legitimacy and efficacy of their
nation's land dispute settlement process. Over time, the Permanent Fo-
rum's opinions on the application of the Declaration can shed light on
the ambiguous terms of Article 28. Second, legal assistance from organi-
zations such as Human Rights First or law school human rights clinics
can provide resources that help indigenous peoples overcome the disad-
vantages discussed in Parts I and II. Finally, domestic and international
courts should be encouraged to relax procedural hurdles that often bar
indigenous peoples from fully litigating their claims.
I. ARTICLE 28 IN THE COURTS: A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
Before delving into recommendations for improving the efficacy of
Article 28, it is helpful to discuss, from a theoretical perspective, how
the Article's command for just, fair, and equitable compensation might
play out in courts. This Part argues that indigenous peoples are likely to
fall into the role of one-shotters and that governments are likely to play
the role of repeat players. This paradigm increases the likelihood that
indigenous peoples will not prevail in their claims for land rights or that
courts may begin to interpret Article 28 in a way that does not truly
benefit indigenous peoples.
A. Repeat Players and One-Shotters
To understand the disadvantages faced by indigenous peoples in the
litigation process it is helpful to make a few generalizations. First, in-
digenous peoples lost their land a relatively long time ago. Under the
typical situation, a colonizing nation moved in and took over. 4 History is
replete with examples: the displacement of indigenous tribes in the
rights." U.N. Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/
(last visited Jan. 28, 2010).
22. For the Permanent Forum to actually take on this new role, ECOSOC might need to
amend the Permanent Forum's mandate. See infra Part III.A.
23. There are ways besides using case studies that might allow the Permanent Forum to
diminish the effect of the repeat player/one-shoter paradigm. For instance, the Permanent
Forum could actually assist indigenous peoples in litigation through filing the equivalent of an
amicus brief. See infra Part m.
24. See Federico Lenzerini, Sovereignty Revisited: International Law and Parallel
Sovereignty of Indigenous Peoples, 42 TEX. INT'L L.J. 155, 167 (2007) (noting that colonizing
nations justified their occupation on the legal fiction of terra nullius-a concept now de-
bunked in international law); see also S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 29-31 (2d ed. 2004).
[Vol. 31:449
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Americas during the 18th and 19th centuries, the colonization of Africa
by various European countries, and the conquest of the Aboriginals in
Australia to name a few. 25 Thus, indigenous minorities often bring claims1 6
after statutes of limitations have expired, and evidence of dispossession
either does not exist or is poorly preserved." Moreover, the current pos-
sessors have developed the land without anticipating that dispossessed
indigenous peoples will someday seek to reclaim the land. 8
Second, the conflicting parties are the indigenous peoples and the
government. 29 Any group of indigenous people is likely to have a single
claim to a single tract of land and is thus unlikely to appear frequently
before a court or tribunal.0 In contrast, a government is likely to confront
numerous claimants. For instance, the United States is likely to defend
land claims against a panoply of Native American groups, whereas indi-
vidual, autonomous Native American groups are likely to litigate far
fewer claims for land against the United States.'
25. See generally LINDA TUHIWAI SMITH, DECOLONIZING METHODOLOGIES: RE-
SEARCH AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 21 (1999) ("For many communities there were waves of
different sorts of Europeans; Dutch, Portuguese, British, French, whoever had political ascen-
dancy over a region. And, in each place, after figures such as Columbus and Cook had long
departed, there came a vast array of military personnel, imperial administrators, priests, ex-
plorers, missionaries, colonial officials, artists, entrepreneurs and settlers, who cut a
devastating swathe, and left a permanent wound, on the societies and communities who occu-
pied the lands named and claimed under imperialism.").
26. See, e.g., Alexandre (Sandy) Kedar, The Legal Transformation of Ethnic Geogra-
phy: Israeli Law and the Palestinian Landholder 1948-1967, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.
923, 938 (2001) (discussing problems related to "claim limitations" in the context of old land
disputes).
27. For instance, in the case of the Bedouins in Israel, evidence of their presence in the
Negev can be traced to surveys and documentation from Ottoman and British sources. None-
theless, courts remain wary to give such evidence substantial weight. See generally Kedar,
supra note 26, at 939; Ronen Shamir, Suspended in Space: Bedouins Under the Law of Israel,
30 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 231, 239-40 (1996).
28. The relatively long time between dispossession and redemption is often used to
buttress the current possessor's argument that the land has been adversely possessed. See
Kedar, supra note 26, at 938.
29. See Lenzerini, supra note 24, at 167-74 (discussing the relationship between states
and indigenous peoples). There are, of course, exceptions to this paradigm. This Note, how-
ever, is limited to examining cases to which the government is a party. The Richtersveld case,
for example, involved an indigenous community and a state-held corporation. See Richters-
veld 1, 1999 (3) SA 1293 (LCC) (S. Afr.), rev'd Richtersveld 11, 2003 (6) BCLR 583 (SCA)
(S. Afr.); Richtersveld II1, 2003 (12) BCLR 1301 (CC) (S. Afr.). Whether the party opposing
the indigenous peoples is the government or a corporation, the party currently in possession of
the land is likely well-funded and holds large quantities of land, which arguably fits the role of
the repeat player.
30. See, e.g., Anaya & Grossman, supra note 19, at 1 (noting that the Awas Tingni
people did not intend to litigate for the purpose of setting precedent, but rather to protect their
own land rights).
31. See, e.g., Cayuga Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Pataki, 413 F.3d 266 (2d Cir. 2005)
(holding that the plaintiff Native American tribe was not entitled to damages for dispossession
of land); Shinnecock Indian Nation v. New York, No. 05-CV-2887 (TCP), 2006 WL 3501099
Winter 2010]
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Thus, to use Professor Galanter's terminology, indigenous peoples
play the role of one-shotters, and governments play the role of repeat
players. Professor Galanter used the repeat player/one-shotter analysis to
explain why frequently litigious groups with substantial resources, such
as governments, regularly win in the litigation context. 2 When a one-
shotter sues a repeat player, the one-shotter is generally in dire need of
an expedient, positive outcome.33 Repeat players, however, enjoy the
luxury of time and resources, which allows them to seek precedent that
favors their long-term interests . A repeat player can use its economic
and informational advantages to settle claims that are likely to result in
unfavorable precedent, seek procedural changes from courts,33 or seek
substantive changes from legislative bodies.36
Indigenous peoples, on the other hand, often find themselves with
the same disadvantages as one-shotters: they face an opponent with
considerable resources and a substantial incentive to seek favorable long-
term precedent.37 As Professor Patrick Macklem points out, "[tihe impor-
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2006) (dismissing a range of claims by a Native American tribe); cf.
Oneida Indian Nation v. New York, 500 F. Supp. 2d 128 (N.D.N.Y. 2007) (denying claims for
possessory land rights because of inconvenience to current owners but allowing claims for
compensation to be considered).
Adverse results for Native American plaintiffs is not a new phenomenon. Unfavorable
precedent was set early in United States history. See Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.)
543, 569 (1823) ("[Sltatutes ... treat [Native Americans] as an inferior race of people, with-
out the privileges of citizens, and under the perpetual protection and pupilage of the
government."); see also infra Part II.A.2 (describing the current administrative process for
claiming land rights in South Africa).
32. Galanter, supra note 13, at 97-104. Professor Galanter's model assumes a litigation
process, which is not necessarily a perfect fit for land disputes involving indigenous peoples
because not all disputes are settled by litigation: land disputes can be resolved by contract or
indigenous peoples might find no forum in which to voice their claims. See id. For the pur-
poses of this Note, the analysis is limited to how indigenous peoples fare in the context of
litigation.
33. Id. at 97-98.
34. Id. at 98-104.
35. Procedural changes are generally in the best interest of repeat players because pro-
cedural rules are "technical, hard to fathom, and difficult to counter." See Grossman et al.,
supra note 15, at 808.
36. Id. at 807.
37. Governments have an incentive to avoid settlements because they want to deter
future litigants. See id. at 804. By showing that they will litigate vigorously, governments are
able to increase the expected costs of potential claimants. See id.
Scholars have argued that repeat player status does not accurately describe the advan-
tages held by governments or large corporations. Richard Lempert, A Classic at 25:
Reflections on Galanter's "Haves" Article and Work It Has Inspired, 33 LAW & Soc'v REv.
1099, 1103 (1999) ("Repeat player status, as characterized by Galanter and as operationalized
by ... empirical studies ... [ ] is highly correlated with advantages of wealth and power and,
in the case of governments, moral status and control of judicial appointments. This situation
makes it difficult if not impossible to identify empirically systematic advantages in litigation
enjoyed by repeat players because they are repeat players rather than because of their wealth
[Vol. 31:449
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tant point is that this process of sovereign exclusion and inclusion was
not a one-shot affair... .38
B. Article 28 Is Susceptible to Abuse
Article 28 tells courts, nations, and international institutions that the
validity of the land restitution process depends on whether a nation pro-
vides a just, fair, and equitable remedy.39 With no additional guidance,
courts are left to their own devices to give meaning to these terms.
Courts, especially in nations where the parties fit into the repeat
player/one-shotter paradigm, are unlikely to fashion rules that allow in-
digenous peoples to return to their traditional lands."0
Again, the experience of indigenous peoples living within the bor-
ders of the United States is illustrative. Courts in the United States
routinely deny claims for land rights because of time bars (for example,
statutes of limitations or laches), the difficulty of fashioning a remedy, orS• 41
the effect of stare decisis. In international fora, indigenous peoples are
likely to face the same sorts of procedural and technical hurdles.42 Thus,
in some cases, courts will not even directly confront the language of Ar-
ticle 28.
Even if courts directly confront the language of Article 28, it is pos-
sible that they will label a remedy just, fair, and equitable even when the
end results are not beneficial for the indigenous plaintiffs.4 For example,
imagine a situation in which a court holds that a just, fair, and equitable
or power or special status as a government litigant."). Regardless of how systemic advantages
are obtained (by repeat player status, wealth, social status, etc.), it is virtually undeniable that
such systemic advantages exist and can be difficult to overcome.
38. Macklem, supra note 1, at 186.
39. See Declaration, supra note 2, art. 28.
40. Even if courts recognize that indigenous peoples have a legitimate claim to the
land, courts are not likely to fashion rules that lead to a complete remedy. See, e.g., Western
Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 39-49 (Oct. 16). As Professor W. Michael Reisman
writes, "in the Western Sahara case, the Court formally acknowledged the existence of a the-
ory of international land tenure based on a non-European conception of title as generative of
'legal ties' (whatever that means). But such 'legal ties' were not enough to defeat title deriv-
ing from a European colonial claim." W. Michael Reisman, Protecting Indigenous Rights in
International Adjudication, 89 Am. J. INT'L L. 350, 354 (1995) (citation omitted). For a simi-
lar analysis, see also Cayuga Indians (Gr. Brit.) v. United States, 6 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 173,
189 (U.S.-Gr. Brit. 1926) (recognizing legitimacy of indigenous land title, but not considering
whether land should be returned to the indigenous community).
41. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 1.
42. See Reisman, supra note 40, at 354-62 (providing an excellent discussion of the
ways in which procedural rules hamper the ability of indigenous groups to litigate in interna-
tional fora).
43. Giving lip service to an indigenous plaintiff's claim for land rights is a realistic
possibility since the Declaration is non-binding and does not provide for an oversight mecha-
nism. Coulter, supra note 4, at 546; Macklem, supra note 1, at 179.
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remedy is relocation to land that is nearly uninhabitable or monetary
compensation in a currency that is of virtually no value.4 In such a situa-
tion, the Declaration does not provide any criteria by which to assess the
validity of the court's remedy.4 ' Recent empirical research indicates that
indigenous peoples face an uphill battle throughout the entire litigation
process-from initiation of a suit to final adjudication in appellate
courts.4'6 Two factors support this conclusion:
First, the government makes the rules, which the courts in turn
enforce.... Second, despite norms of judicial independence,
courts and judges are not independent of government; they are
part of government. Courts are agencies of the state. One possi-
ble impact of this is that judges feel some loyalty toward the
government or regime of which they are a part.47
Breaking the repeat player/one-shotter cycle, however, is a realistic
possibility. In the litigation context, one-shotters can match many of the
advantages that repeat players possess by any method that tends to over-
come the repeat player's economic or information advantage. Examples
include securing the backing of well-funded interest groups or hiring an
attorney who specializes in a particular kind of litigation.4 8 In the United
States, groups like the American Civil Liberties Union or the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People are classic examples
of groups that help one-shotters break the cycle.49 In the United States,
44. See, e.g., Kedar, supra note 26 (describing the proceedings that deprived the Bed-
ouins land in Israel); Reisman, supra note 40 (discussing how international courts have
sidestepped recognition of indigenous peoples).
45. See Kedar, supra note 26; Reisman, supra note 40. This is markedly different from
other international human rights instruments. For example, the Human Rights Committee, the
oversight body responsible for monitoring the implementation of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, publicly provides through General Comments specific standards
for interpreting the Convention's provisions. See Colette Connor, Recent Development: The
United States' Second and Third Periodic Report to the United Nations Human Rights Com-
mittee, 49 HARV. INT'L L.J. 509, 521 (2008). The Committee frequently cites to its General
Comments when reviewing state reports and individual complaints. Id. at 512 n. 13.
46. See generally Herbert M. Kritzer & Susan S. Silbey, The Government Gorilla: Why
Does Government Come Out Ahead in Appellate Courts?, in IN LITIGATION: DO THE 'HAVES'
STILL COME OUT AHEAD? 342 (Herbert M. Kritzer & Susan S. Silbey eds., 2003) (gathering
and analyzing data from U.S. federal and state appellate courts, and the highest courts in Aus-
tralia, Canada, England, India, the Philippines, South Africa, and Tanzania). This study finds
that governments have an even greater advantage than corporations. Id. at 348-49.
47. Id. at 343 (internal citations omitted).
48. See Grossman et al., supra note 15, at 806.
49. See Anne Bloom, Practice Style and Successful Legal Mobilization, 71 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 5-6 (2008) ("When cause lawyers work for nonprofit organizations like
the ACLU and the NAACP, their style of practice tends to more closely resemble the mega-
lawyering style of lawyers in corporate practice. Perhaps because of this, Galanter describes
[Vol. 31:449
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and on an international scale, groups like the Indian Law Resource Cen-
ter provide invaluable information-sharing and legal resources to
indigenous peoples. °
Many indigenous peoples, however, do not have ready access to in-
terest groups or institutions that are capable of helping them break the
economic and information advantages that governments typically enjoy."
Therefore, for indigenous peoples unable to overcome the repeat
player/one-shotter paradigm, Article 28's efficacy is severely limited. As
discussed above, this imbalance of power could lead courts either to (1)
fashion procedural rules that limit the indigenous peoples' access to jus-
tice or (2) interpret Article 28 in a manner contrary to its plain language
and intent.
Part II discusses two cases in which indigenous communities have
successfully broken through the repeat player/one-shotter paradigm.
Even for indigenous peoples fortunate enough to successfully litigate
their claims before domestic or international tribunals, indigenous peo-
ples still suffer serious impediments to enforcing court judgments.
II. PROBLEMS WITH IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT
OF JUDGMENTS: EXAMPLES FROM SOUTH AFRICA AND NICARAGUA
Richtersveld and Awas Tingni were celebrated decisions that cannot
be said to have run afoul of the Declaration. 4 In each case, the
the legal style of cause lawyers as 'an approximation of mega-law[yering] with less ample
funding."').
50. See Indian Law Res. Ctr., Project for a New Framework of Law, http://
www.indianlaw.org/en/projects/landrights/landlaw (last visited Jan. 28, 2010).
51. See generally Robyn Eversole, Overview-Patterns of Indigenous Disadvantage
Worldwide, in INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND POVERTY 29 (Robyn Eversole et al. eds., 2005). Part
III of this Note, infra, will discuss ways that the United Nations and other international or-
ganizations can limit the government's inherent advantage by mitigating the effects of
economic and information asymmetries.
52. In an effort to counter this, Part III proposes that the U.N. Permanent Forum on
Indigenous Issues or a similar U.N. body take on an oversight role to help clarify the meaning
of just, fair, and equitable compensation.
53. See, e.g., Anaya & Grossman, supra note 19, at 1 (describing the Awas Tingni case
as a major step forward in international law); Aeyal M. Gross, The Constitution, Reconcilia-
tion, and Transitional Justice: Lessons from South Africa and Israel, 40 STAN. J. INT'L L. 47,
92 (2004) (listing Richtersveld as a landmark property rights case from a transitional justice
perspective).
54. The discussion that follows is incredibly brief compared to the wealth of literature
discussing each of these cases. The purpose of this Part is to demonstrate that even expertly
litigated and persuasively written decisions do not always lead to the full vindication of the
land rights of indigenous peoples. Thus, nothing in this Part should be read as detracting from
these cases in any way.
For further reading, consult the Spring 2002 issue of the Arizona Journal of International
and Comparative Law, which discusses the Awas Tingni case and provides the complaint, the
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indigenous peoples asserting their right to land were victorious in the
courts." In neither case, however, was the court's decision widely or
swiftly implemented. After Awas Tingni, the plaintiffs struggled to get
their judgment enforced and after Richtersveld, other similarly situated
plaintiffs failed to achieve the same success.
This Part illustrates the need for strategic guidance and assistance to
nations and international institutions attempting to implement Article
28's call for just, fair, and equitable compensation.
A. South Africa
After the fall of the apartheid state, South Africa undertook an ambi-
tious agenda to undo the complex and firmly established legal
framework that oppressed the black majority. 6 Land rights were central
to South Africa's rebuilding process, 7 and those rights were first tested
in the Richtersveld case.
1. The Richtersveld Case
The people of Richtersveld occupied the northwestern comer of
what is now the Northern Cape Province of South Africa.58 Despite the
annexation of their land by the British in 1847, the people of the Rich-
tersveld Community (Community) were the exclusive occupiers of their
land until diamonds were discovered in the mid- 1920s.'9 The South Afri-
can government then moved quickly to secure rights to the diamonds.
6
0
First, the Community was told that it could not mine the diamonds;
61
then a commission was established to relocate the Community.62 The
commission recommended that the Community receive 2,000 British
Pounds for their land.63 This compensation, however, was insignificant in
reply, the transcript, the written arguments, the judgment, and the opinions. For further discus-
sion of the Richtersveld case, see JOAN G. FAIRWEATHER, A COMMON HUNGER: LAND
RIGHTS IN CANADA AND SOUTH AFRICA 107 (2006); Yvette Trahan, Recent Developments,
The Richtersveld Community & Others v. Alexkor Ltd.: Declaration of a "Right in Land"
Through a "Customary Law Interest" Sets Stage for Introduction of Aboriginal Title into
South African Legal System, 12 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 565, 565-85 (2004).
55. See infra Parts II.A.2, II.B.2.
56. See generally ROBERT Ross, A CONCISE HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICA 154-213 (2d
ed. 2008).
57. See generally Richard Levin & Daniel Weiner, The Politics of Land Reform in
South Africa After Apartheid: Perspectives, Problems, Prospects, 23 J. PEASANT STUD. 93
(1996).
58. Richtersveld 11, 2003 (6) BCLR 583 (SCA) § 2 (S. Afr.).
59. Id. 2, 67.
60. Id. 78-79.
61. FAIRWEATHER, supra note 54, at 107.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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light of the Community's treatment. Many members of the Community
were forced to work in the diamond mines performing menial jobs at
wages well below those of white workers. 6' Through the rise of the
apartheid state, the Community lost more and more of their land until it
was entirely dispossessed in 19936
After the fall of the apartheid state,66 the Community brought suit in
the Land Claims Court under the 1994 Restitution of Land Rights Act
and under the common law doctrine of aboriginal title.67 Under the Act,
the Community was required to prove that dispossession (1) took place
after June 19, 1913, and (2) was the result of racial discrimination. Fur-
thermore, if claims had not made before December 31, 1998, they would
have been completely extinguished.69
The Land Claims Court dismissed the Community's claim.70 The
court recognized that the claim was lodged within the statute of limita-
tions and that the Richtersveld people formed a distinct ethic group
because they "shared the same culture, including the same language, re-
ligion, social and political structures, customs and lifestyle."'"
Nonetheless, it denied the Community relief because it found that the
land was initially dispossessed by the British via annexation in 184772-
that is, the Community failed to establish that its dispossession was the
result of racial discrimination perpetrated by the apartheid state after
1913.73
64. Id. at 107-08.
65. Id. at 108 (noting that the Coloured Rural Areas Act of 1963 began the process of
dispossession); Richtersveld 11, 2003 (6) BCLR 583 (SCA) H 94-95 (S. Afr.) (finding that the
land was given to Alexkor Limited, a corporation with the government as sole shareholder).
66. The South African approach to land redistribution was developed principally as a
response to apartheid. FAIRWEATHER, supra note 54, at 118. Therefore, the drafters of the
South African Constitution and the Restitution Act focused on alleviating the vestiges of racist
policies, as opposed to colonial policies. See id. Richtersveld demonstrates considerable re-
spect for the traditions of the Richtersveld Community (Community). At trial, the court heard
testimony about the Community's spiritual cohesiveness and connection to the land. See id. at
110. This testimony, allowed over the government's objection, came from historians, scholars,
and individuals from the Community. Id. This approach is probably of the sort that the draft-
ers had in mind when they drafted Article 27, which provides for "due recognition to
indigenous peoples' laws, traditions, customs and land tenure systems." Declaration, supra
note 2, art. 27.
67. Richtersveld 1, 1999 (3) SA 1293 (LCC) 4 (S. Afr.), rev'd Richtersveld 11, 2003
(6) BCLR 583 (SCA) (S. Afr.); FAIRWEATHER, supra note 54, at 109.
68. Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994, §§ 2-3 (S. Afr.).
69. Id. § 2(e).
70. Richtersveld II, 2003 (6) BCLR 583 18 (SCA) (S. Afr.).
71. Id.
72. Id. 7.
73. The Land Restitution Act specifies the year 1913 as the cutoff date because that is
the date that the Natives Land Act 27 of 1913 was passed. T.W. Bennett & C.H. Powell, Abo-
riginal Title in South Africa Revisited, 15 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 449, 450 (1999). The Native
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The Supreme Court of Appeals reversed and held that the Commu-
nity was actually dispossessed of its land in the 1920s when diamonds
were discovered . The Supreme Court of Appeals further held that the
Community could recover under the South African Constitution, which
provides that "[a] person or community dispossessed of property after 19
June 1913 as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices is
entitled, to the extent provided by an Act of Parliament, either to restitu-
tion of that property or to equitable redress."7
Nearly five years after the Community initiated the case, the Consti-tutinalCout rederd is "76
tutional Court rendered its judgment. The Constitutional Court rejected
the government's claims and found that the Community's land rights in
fact survived the annexation by the British, that the Community had a
right to land in 1913, and that the Community was dispossessed of its
land as a result of racial discrimination. Thus the Community achieved
a complete victory. Nevertheless, as discussed below, the implementation
of the judgment was less successful.
2. Land Rights in the Wake of Richtersveld
While many lawyers and scholars recognized the Richtersveld deci-
sion as a watershed decision for indigenous communities, many people
and communities in South Africa have not received the same sort of ad-
judicatory process.79 Many South Africans who were dispossessed of
their land during apartheid never had their land rights restored. ° In a
typical example, a rural, usually subsistence, farmer was evicted on pa-
per but remained on the land due to an oral agreement with the white
owner." The Restitution Act did not protect his rights because his land
was not physically taken from him82 and thus he and many similarly situ-
ated plaintiffs could not take advantage of Richtersveld's groundbreaking
precedent. This sort of procedural hurdle is a classic example of how a
Lands Act 27 of 1913 is generally considered the beginning of racial discrimination in land
rights. See id.
74. Richtersveld I1, 2003 (6) BCLR 583 8.
75. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996, § 25(7).
76. FAIRWEATHER, supra note 54, at 113-14.
77. See generally Richtersveld 111, 2003 (12) BCLR (CC) 1301 (S. Mr.).
78. See, e.g., Gross, supra note 53, at 92 (listing the Richtersveld case as a landmark
property rights case from a transitional justice perspective); Tears of Joy as Richtersveld Land
Claim Is Settled, MAIL & GUARDIAN ONLINE, http://www.mg.co.za/article/2007-10-09-tears-
of-joy-as-richtersveld-land-claim-is-settled (last visited Jan. 28, 2010).
79. FAIRWEATHER, supra note 54, at 119-20.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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procedural or jurisdictional element favors a repeat player over a one-
shotter.
Since 1995, with the introduction of the Land Reform Pilot Pro-
gramme, redistribution has accounted for the transfer of just under 0.6%
of the country's agricultural land.83 Due primarily to a lack of capacity at
the Land Claims Court, most claims for restitution were not resolved by
the 1998 filing deadline and still more claims were never brought.M The
Land Claims Court's inability to deal with the onslaught of claims even-
tually caused the South African government to abandon the judicial
process in favor of administrative proceedings. 5 The administrative
process dramatically increased the number of resolved claims.86 Fur-
thermore, pursuant to recommendations from the World Bank, the South
African government offered a "willing seller and willing buyer" model
as an alternative to the adjudicatory process." Scholars recognize that
South Africa's land restitution process has drastically changed since
Richtersvela8 and that South Africa's current practices seem divorced
from the constitutional vision.89
The outcome of Richtersveld has been a cause crl~bre throughout
South Africa and the world.' The rarity of cases like Richtersveld,
83. Michael Aliber, Chronic Poverty in South Africa: Incidence, Causes and Policies,
31 WORLD DEV. 473, 480 (2003). Of course, land ownership is not the same as restitution, and
large scale restitution is not necessarily economically viable or desirable. See generally Who
Owns the Land?, BBC NEws, Aug. 8, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/594522.stm (last
visited Jan. 28, 2010).
84. FAIRWEATHER, supra note 54, at 119 (noting that by 2001, nearly three years after
the filing date had passed, only about 12,500 of the 67,000 filed claims had been settled).
85. See id.
86. See Edward Lahiff, Land Reform in South Africa: A Status Report, 38 RES. REP.
PROGRAMME LAND & AGRARIAN STUD. 13 (2008) (finding that only 5279 outstanding claims
remained after 2007).
87. Id. at 33 ("The 'willing buyer, willing seller' model, based on the World Bank's
recommendations for a market-led reform, emphasised the voluntary nature of the process,
payment of full market-related prices, up-front and in cash, a reduced role for the state (rela-
tive to previous 'state-led' reforms elsewhere in the world) and the removal of various
'distortions' within the land market.").
88. See id. ("The 'willing buyer, willing seller' approach has remained at the centre of
the South African land reform policy, despite widespread opposition and recurring promises
of change from government leaders.").
89. FAIRWEATHER, supra note 54, at 118-19 (noting that some scholars consider the
current land restitution practices to be "lip service" to the goals enunciated in the South Afri-
can Constitution); see also Andries du Toit, The End of Restitution: Getting Real About Land
Claims, in AT THE CROSSROADS: LAND AND AGRARIAN REFORM IN SOUTH AFRICA INTO THE
21ST CENTURY 75, 75-76 (Ben Cousins ed., 2000) (discussing the slow progress of land resti-
tution and the constitutional underpinnings on land restitution).
90. See, e.g., Marcia Barry, Now Another Thing Must Happen: Richtersveld and the
Dilemmas of Land Reform in Post-Apartheid South Africa, 20 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 355, 355
(2004); see also Lisa Strelein, From Mabo to Yorta Yorta: Native Title Law in Australia, 19
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however, demonstrates the difficulty of maintaining a system that pro-
vides a fair way for indigenous minorities to attain just, fair, and
equitable compensation. Thus, despite Richtersveld, South Africa's cur-
rent land restitution process may not live up to the standards set forth in
the Declaration and, as this experience demonstrates, even once a nation
establishes a just, fair, and equitable system, nations may struggle to
widely implement that system.
B. Nicaragua
The Awas Tingni case was another major victory for indigenous peo-
ples. Unlike in Richtersveld, an international court-the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights-decided the case.9 ' Nicaragua, however, strug-
gled to comply with the standards articulated by the IACtHR.92
1. The Awas Tingni Case
Like many indigenous communities, the Awas Tingni lived on lands
that were not legally recognized by the government as their own.93 Thus,
while they lived in the same place for many years, they lived on govern-
ment land.94 Not having legal title became a problem for the Awas Tingni
when the government of Nicaragua began to allow logging on the land
they had traditionally occupied. 95 Despite assistance from international
non-governmental organizations and pro bono legal counsel,96 the Awas
Tingni were unsuccessful in their attempts to compromise with the Nica-
raguan government. 97 In 1998, they brought their case to the IACtHR. 98
WASH. U. J.L. & POL'y 225, 247 (2005) (discussing the landmark status of Richtersveld
among cases involving indigenous peoples rights).
91. Anaya & Grossman, supra note 19, at 1.
92. See discussion infra Part H.B.2.
93. Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
C) No. 79, at 1103 (Aug. 31, 2001); Anaya & Grossman, supra note 19, at 2.
94. Awas Tingni, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 103. This is a common problem for in-
digenous peoples, especially those who live in rural areas. See, e.g., Shamir, supra note 27, at
238-42 (discussing the property rights of Bedouins in the Negev).
95. Anaya & Grossman, supra note 19, at 2.
96. The talent and experience of legal counsel and consultants who came to the aid of
the Awas Tingni was remarkable. The legal team included James Anaya and John Allen from
the University of Iowa College of Law, S. Todd Crider of Simpson, Thacher & Bartlett LLP,
and Maria Luisa Acosta (local counsel from Nicaragua), with the Indian Law Resource Center
also assisting. Id. at 3 nA.
The Awas Tingni also received assistance with "historical, ethnographical, and geo-
graphical data relevant to its land claim" from Harvard University's Weatherhead Center for
International Affairs. Id. at 5. This sort of international cooperation is essential to overcoming
the repeat player/one-shotter paradigm.
97. ld. at 6.
98. Awas Tingni, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 1 1-74 (discussing procedural history).
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The Awas Tingni asked the IACtHR to require Nicaragua "to estab-
lish and implement a procedure that would result in the prompt
demarcation and specific recognition of Awas Tingni communal lands
... and to provide monetary compensation to Awas Tingni for the in-
fringement of its territorial rights." 9 The Awas Tingni built their case
through testimony from nearby communities, ethnographic research, and
• 100
mapping. The ethnographic research and mapping were provided on a
pro bono basis.'0 ' The government of Nicaragua argued that the Awas
Tingni had not been on the land for a sufficiently long period of time and
that the community was claiming more land than it could possibly be
entitled to. 2
Ultimately, the IACtHR found that the Awas Tingni were entitled to
land, and held that the American Convention on Human Rights protects
the right of indigenous peoples to occupy and use their customary
lands.' 3 The IACtHR further held that the Awas Tingni's property rights
were violated by Nicaragua because the government permitted deliberate
encroachments on Awas Tingni territory.'" The IACtHR's holding, how-
ever, did not create any specific guidance on how the land rights of the
Awas Tingni should be implemented or how other claims for land by
indigenous communities should proceed.' 5
2. Land Rights in the Wake of Awas Tingni
Implementation of the IACtHR's decision presented substantial dif-
ficulties. ' 6 Leonardo J. Alvarado, an attorney who assisted the Awas
Tingni wrote that "itlhe most important element of the Court's ruling-
the actual demarcation of Awas Tingni territory-entailed a process
plagued with unacceptable delays, dilatory practices by the government,
99. Anaya & Grossman, supra note 19, at 9; Awas Tingni, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
167.
100. Anaya & Grossman, supra note 19, at 5-6.
101. Id. at 5.
102. Id. at 9.
103. Awas Tingni, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. [ 167-73.
104. Id.
105. See id.; Anaya & Grossman, supra note 19, at 15.
106. The IACtHR's decisions are binding on countries that have ratified the American
Convention on Human Rights. American Convention on Human Rights art. 68(1), Nov. 22,
1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (entered into force July 18, 1978) ("The States Parties to the Con-
vention undertake to comply with the judgment of the Court in any case to which they are
parties.") [hereinafter American Convention]. However, like many international agreements,
enforcement mechanisms under the American Convention are weak. See JACK L. GOLDSMITH
& ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 217 (2005) (arguing that the lack of
enforcement mechanisms "make international collective action problems difficult to overcome
even when there is a plausible argument that the international regime, if successful, would
enhance the welfare of every participating state.").
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and an overall lack of political will to recognize the full extent of the
Awas Tingni's territorial claim.'
0 7
Nicaragua began the process of demarcation by establishing a com-
mission to comply with the IACtHR's decision and negotiate
implementation with the Awas Tingni.' °8 Negotiations, however, broke
down, and the Awas Tigni continued to suffer third party encroachment
on their land.i 9 Eventually, the Awas Tingni returned to the IACtHR to
ask for an extraordinary form of relief known as a Provisional Measures
Resolution that would require "Nicaragua to immediately adopt any
measures necessary to protect the community's right to the use and en-
joyment of its lands and natural resources in order to avoid the
'immediate and irreparable damage resulting from activities of third par-
ties who have established themselves inside the territory .... ' "",'0 The
court affirmed the Awas Tingni's rights, but, once again, the Nicaraguan
government was slow to comply."' The Awas Tingni filed an action in
Nicaraguan court seeking to enforce the judgment, but more than four
years passed before the Regional Council ratified a resolution demarcat-
ing Awas Tingni land."2 Once land was demarcated, the IACtHR moved
swiftly to approve the resolution, and title was awarded to the Awas
Tingni in December of 2008.'"
Over the seven years that elapsed between the IACtHR's judgment
and demarcation, the Awas Tingni suffered continual encroachment on
107. Alvarado, supra note 19, at 618-19. Nevertheless, the government of Nicaragua has
paid at least $30,000 in monetary reparations. Id. at 619. Nicaragua has also implemented a
procedure to settle land disputes with indigenous minorities. Id. at 624. Nicaragua's process
for settling land disputes was established after the World Bank conditioned a loan on compli-
ance with that aspect of the IACtHR's decision. Id.; see also Press Release, World Bank,
Nicaragua: World Bank, Government of Nicaragua Sign US$32.6 Million Credit to Support
Land Administration (June 24, 2002), available at http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/
EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/0,,contentMDK:20051334-menuPK:64282138-pagePK:41367-piP
K:279616-theSitePK:40941,00.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2010).
108. Alvarado, supra note 19, at 619-20.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 620-21 (quoting Order of the Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. Mayagna (Sumo) Awas
Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, at 6, 1 (Sept. 6, 2002)).
111. Id. at 621.
112. Indigenous Peoples Law & Policy Program, Univ. of Ariz. James E. Rogers Coll. of
Law, Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua, http://www.law.arizona.edu/depts/iplp/advocacy/awastingni/
index.cfm?page=advoc (last visited Jan. 28, 2010); see also Alvarado, supra note 19, at 621
(positing that "[tihe lack of response to this latest legal action can be attributed to the politiciza-
tion and corruption that has plagued the Nicaraguan judicial system to the detriment of
indigenous communities and other non-powerful sectors of society that have attempted to obtain
justice through the courts"). The Indigenous Peoples Law & Policy Program assisted the Awas
Tingni in their effort to secure land rights.
113. Indigenous Peoples Law & Policy Program, supra note 112 (providing copies of
the IACtHR resolution and the agreement between the government of Nicaragua and the
Awas Tingni).
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their land."4 In particular, the Awas Tingni struggled to prevent local
logging companies from entering their land."5 Furthermore, the Awas
Tingni struggled to clearly define their land rights in relation to neigh-
boring communities, which also sought title to land allocated to the
Awas Tingni. ' 16 Not only did this create a delicate situation between the
Awas Tingni and their neighbors, but the Nicaraguan government also
used this as evidence against the Awas Tingni at both the IACtHR and
the regional demarcation proceedings." 7
Awas Tingni is undoubtedly a landmark case for indigenous land
rights. The indigenous community was successful against a government
that had a substantial incentive to litigate vigorously. The case also rep-
resented how international assistance can help overcome the one-
shotter/repeat player paradigm.18 From the long process endured by the
Awas Tingni and their legal team, the international community can learn
a great deal about litigating land claims brought by indigenous peoples.
Nonetheless, international law and policy still has a long way to go if
this sort of success is to be replicated.
Both Richtersveld and Awas Tingni are pre-Declaration cases. The
natural question, therefore, is whether the Declaration would have
changed how these cases played out. Each of these cases, insofar as its
holding is concerned, appears to be in line with the Declaration. In other
words, the prescribed remedies in Richtersveld and Awas Tingni appear
to each fall within the ambit of just, fair, and equitable. However, the
lesson of Richtersveld and Awas Tingni is found in the subsequent prac-
tical, enforcement-related problems not specifically addressed by Article
28. Thus, with respect to the practical problems addressed in this Part,
Article 28 would probably not have had a meaningful effect.
Part III draws on the theoretical analysis in Part I and the case stud-
ies discussed in Part II to make recommendations to improve Article 28's
capacity to benefit indigenous peoples.
114. See id.
115. Alvarado, supra note 19, at 621-22 ("[Foreign-based logging companies] have
been replaced by illegal logging operations carried out by a diverse set of local actors includ-
ing ex-combatants, members of neighboring communities, and even public officials.").
116. Id. at 628-32.
117. Id. at 628-30.
118. See supra note 96 (discussing the legal team that assisted the Awas Tingni).
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III. How THE UNITED NATIONS AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS CAN IMPROVE THE MEANING AND
EFFICACY OF ARTICLE 28
A. Oversight, Monitoring, and Empowerment
The Declaration needs an oversight body with the capacity to declare
the meaning of Article 28. The United Nations Permanent Forum on In-
digenous Issues is one group that could serve such a function. The
Permanent Forum should begin using case studies to analyze and cri-
tique the land restitution methods used by various nations, "9 By virtue of
the Permanent Forum's clout and ability to connect and communicate
with indigenous groups worldwide, the Permanent Forum could give
indigenous communities a wealth of resources on which to draw.'20 The
Permanent Forum, therefore, can help level the playing field by dimin-
ishing some of the economic and information advantages that
governments retain.
The Permanent Forum should publish a series of case studies or
comments that describe the processes and remedies used by nations that
undertake the land restitution process.' 21 In these case studies, the Per-
manent Forum should draw legal conclusions about whether each nation
is living up to the standards set forth in Article 28-whether its land res-
titution process provides for due recognition and just, fair, and
119. See supra note 45 (discussing the Human Rights Committee and its ability to issue
General Comments on the implementation and meaning of the ICCPR).
120. The Permanent Forum was established as a subsidiary organ of the United Nations
Economic and Social Council. See ECOSOC Res. 2000/22, 2, U.N. Doc. E/2000/INF/
2/Add.2 (July 28, 2000) ("[T]he Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues shall serve as an
advisory body to the Council with a mandate to discuss indigenous issues within the mandate
of the Council relating to economic and social development, culture, the environment, educa-
tion, health and human rights .... ").
The Permanent Forum's mandate is sweeping but relatively mild. It includes: providing
"expert advice and recommendations on indigenous issues to the Council," raising awareness
and promoting the indigenous issues within the U.N. system, and disseminating information
on indigenous issues. John Carey & Siegfried Wiessner, A New United Nations Subsidiary
Organ: The Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, AM. Soc'v INT'L L., Apr. 2001,
http://www.asil.org/insigh67.cfm (last visited Jan. 28, 2010). From the Permanent Forum's
inception, its mandate to push for reform, particularly in the area of land rights, has been am-
biguous. Id.
121. Writing authoritative opinions on the meaning of the Declaration would be analo-
gous to the role played by the Human Rights Committee, in interpreting the ICCPR. Connor,
supra note 45, at 511.
122. The concept of recognition is a classic subject in international law. See JOHN DUG-
ARD, RECOGNITION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 43-45 (1987); THOMAS D. GRANT, THE
RECOGNITION OF STATES: LAW AND PRACTICE IN DEBATE AND EVOLUTION XX (1999) (recog-
nizing a distinction between political and legal recognition). The scholarship on recognition
typically analyzes whether the international community will choose to deal with a questiona-
bly elected government, a rebel group, or a secessionist state. See Robert D. Sloane, The
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equitable compensation. Indigenous peoples seeking to secure land
rights in other nations could then use the Permanent Forum's case stud-
ies to lobby for procedural and substantive changes that conform to the
Declaration. 123 The case studies produced by the Permanent Forum
could, over time, act as quasi-precedent that enable indigenous commu-
nities to hold states to account.
1 24
Case studies or comments, however, need to recognize the complex
political, cultural, historical, and economic environment in which in-
digenous peoples seek to obtain title to their native lands. In South
Africa, for instance, the new government struggled to create a land resti-
tution policy that addressed the country's diverse needs.'25 South Africa,
like many developing nations, seeks to create a thriving and sustainable
agricultural sector.126 Land redistribution, especially on a large scale, can
hamper sustainable and robust agricultural development. 27 In this regard,
simply transferring title to land without considering the economic and
development consequences can have troubling effects.'28 Therefore, the
Permanent Forum or similar oversight body would be wise to consider
the economic climate in which it interprets the Declaration.'
29
Changing Face of Recognition in International Law: A Case Study of Tibet, 16 EMORY INT'L
L. REV. 107, 109-10 (2002) (defining three forms of recognition: political, legal, and civil).
The canonical work on the subject of recognition does not appear to contemplate indige-
nous peoples. See generally PHILIP C. JESSUP, THE BIRTH OF NATIONS (1974); HERSCH
LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1947). The Permanent Forum might
be able to draw upon the rich scholarly writings that deal with recognition of nations, states,
and governments. However, whether and how the Permanent Forum, or legal scholars in gen-
eral, should borrow from this literature is a fascinating question beyond the scope of this Note.
123. See Macklem, supra note 1, at 179 (discussing the value of the Declaration as pro-
viding for diffuse legal consequences).
124. Id.
125. Yves Van Leynseele & Paul Hebinck, Through the Prism: Local Reworking of
Land Restitution Settlements in South Africa, in THE RIGHTS AND WRONGS OF LAND RESTI-
TUTION: 'RESTORING WHAT WAS OURS' 163, 164-66 (Derick Fay & Deborah James eds.,
2009).
126. See Hasani Claxton, Land and Liberation: Lessons for the Creation of Effective
Land Reform Policy in South Africa, 8 MICH. J. RACE & L. 529 (2003).
127. For example, in Zimbabwe, land reform appears to be a failure in both political and
economic terms. Karol Boudreaux, A New Call of the Wild: Community-Based Natural Re-
source Management in Namibia, 20 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 297, 320 (2008) ("Due to
[Zimbabwean] government policies, land tenure in Zimbabwe for both whites and blacks is
highly insecure, the economic situation has dramatically deteriorated and violence and censor-
ship has increased.").
128. See id.
129. The law and economics of land reform is a subject of a contentious debate that is
well beyond the scope of this Note. See, e.g., REPARATIONS FOR INDIGENOUS PEOPLES:
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (Federico Lenzerini ed., 2009) (collect-
ing diverse and divergent viewpoints on reparations); Online NewsHour: Land
Redistribution in Southern Africa, http:l/www.pbs.org/newshour/bblafrica/land/index.html
(last visited Feb. 19, 2010). Nonetheless, it is an essential issue for any decision-making
body to consider. See KLAUS DEININGER, WORLD BANK, LAND POLICIES AND LAND
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While these case studies would have little, or perhaps no binding ef-
fect on many national courts,'3° they could at least provide some
guidance. The benefits of case studies are probably more political than
jurisprudential.' Therefore, indigenous peoples are more likely to use
the Permanent Forum's case studies as a tool to lobby legislatures for
procedural or substantive changes.'
Regardless of whether the Permanent Forum's case studies are used
in courts or as leverage in the lobbying process, the case studies have the
effect of mitigating the economic and information advantages held by
repeat players. Economic and information advantages as understood in
the repeat player/one-shotter paradigm typically include the ability sim-
ply to throw more resources at a problem.'33 For example, governments
can hire more attorneys, who have more experience, more time to re-
search, and who are litigating to set a precedent that might deter other
claims. The Permanent Forum's case studies could provide indigenous
peoples with a readymade argument and set of alternative approaches for
courts and legislatures to consider. Furthermore, the information gap
would be diminished if indigenous peoples had the opportunity to learn
from each other's tactics. Case studies can serve as a mechanism to con-
nect indigenous land claimants, thus furthering the Permanent Forum's
mandate, which includes "prepar[ing] and disseminat[ing] information
on indigenous issues.' 35 Using case studies to analyze whether nations
are living up to the standards of the Declaration, therefore, is perhaps a
politically palatable and feasible way for the Permanent Forum to create
meaning out of the ambiguous wording of Article 28.136
REFORM, available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTISPMA/Resources/Training-
Events-and-Materials/landpoliciesreform.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2010).
130. See generally SHAHEED FATIMA, USING INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC
COURTS (2005) (recognizing that national courts vary widely in their treatment of international
law in domestic cases).
131. As previously explained the Declaration is non-binding and to reach the level of
hard law would need to be ratified as a treaty. See generally Oscar Schachter, United Nations
Law, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 9-16 (discussing compliance and enforcement of U.N. treaties and
declarations). Even if that were to happen, the nations could still escape its force through
reservations. Id.
132. See Coulter, supra note 4, at 546, 552. Nevertheless, the Declaration arguably may
contribute to the development of customary international law. See, e.g., id. at 551-52.
133. See supra Part I.A.
134. See Galanter, supra note 13, at 135-39.
135. U.N. Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, Permanent Forum: Origin and De-
velopment, http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/en/about-us.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2010).
136. Case studies would also be a powerful tool for international human rights organiza-
tions, which have been growing in scholarship and in practice. In scholarship, see, for
example, AMNESTY INT'L, HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AGAINST INDIGENOUS PEOPLES OF
THE AMERICAS (1992); ANAYA, supra note 24; JULIAN BERGER, ABORIGINES TODAY: LAND
AND JUSTICE (1988); SHELTON H. DAVIS, LAND RIGHTS AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: THE
ROLE OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1988); JEREMIE GILBERT,
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The principles underlying Article 28 could also be strengthened by
the nascent Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights.' The Optional Protocol would give
the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights the ability to
receive and consider communications related to the Covenant.'38 Many of
the rights articulated in the Covenant are closely related to Article 28 of
the Declaration. For example, the Covenant guarantees rights to cultural
and scientific progress.'" It is conceivable, albeit unlikely, that the prin-
ciples of Article 28 could be included in the Committee's analysis of the
Covenant if the ability to have and hold land, including native land, were
considered part and parcel of cultural and scientific progress.
B. Institutional Capability and Political Pressure
Once a nation (or the international community) makes a commit-
ment of providing just, fair, and equitable compensation to indigenous
peoples with legitimate claims, many administrative and political issues
will remain. For example, in South Africa, the courts simply became
overwhelmed with claimants and were unable to sustain the sort of fact-
intensive process followed in Richtersveld.4 0 In Nicaragua, on the other
hand, the government lacked the political will and institutional capacity
to follow the mandate of the IACtHR. 4 ' Therefore, in order to improve
the implementation of judgments, the international community will need
to improve the institutional capacity of nascent judicial systems and find
ways to help states summon the political will to return land to indige-
nous peoples. 
42
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES' LAND RIGHTS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW: FROM VICTIMS TO Ac-
TORS (2006); INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND PROTECTED AREAS: THE LAW OF THE MOTHER
EARTH (Elizabeth Kemf ed., 1993). In practice, see for example, Indigenous Peoples Law and
Policy Program, supra note 112 (noting that this Program was principally responsible for the
success in the Awas Tingni case).
137. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, G.A. Res. 63/117, art. 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/l17 (Dec. 10, 2008) [hereinafter Op-
tional Protocol]; see also Press Release, New Optional Protocol to the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, U.N. Doc. L/T/4418 (Sept. 30, 2009), available at
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/Lt4418.doc.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2010).
138. Optional Protocol, supra note 137, art. 2.
139. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200
(XXI), art. 15, U.N. Doc. A/RES/21/2200 (Dec. 16, 1966).
140. See supra Part Il.A.2.
141. See supra Part 11.B.2.
142. This section, of course, only begins to list the variety of public policy measures that
might be used to assist the implementation of judgments.
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One method of improving the implementation of judgments is
through rule of law initiatives,13 which are generally considered a form
of soft power or diplomacy.'" While there are many policies that might
prove beneficial, one that can be successful is known as "reinforcement
by reward.' ' 5 In short, such a policy requires that "[g]overnments that
fail to respond to incentives to adopt and implement prescribed reforms
are neither coerced nor rewarded, but are left to bear the costs of exclu-
sion (from aid allocation, favorable trade and investment conditions,
security guarantees, membership in organizations or other forms of link-
ages to benefit-granting international regimes) until such a time as they,
or a successive government, decide to comply.' ' 4 6 While it is unlikely
that the international community would garner the will to use "rein-
forcement by reward" to enforce the Declaration, the international
community may be more likely to act in favor of policies aimed at
strengthening judicial systems and improving access to justice.'4 7 Such
policies, coupled with a more potent and clear understanding of the Dec-
laration, might help create the necessary conditions for indigenous
peoples to successfully obtain and implement a judgment. 41
CONCLUSION
This Note sought to (1) demonstrate why the standards set out in Ar-
ticle 28 require clarification, and (2) propose reforms (both in and
outside of the U.N. framework) that might benefit indigenous peoples
claiming land rights. Part I drew an analogy to Professor Galanter's
143. Rule of law initiatives are a matter of considerable debate. See generally Amichai
Magen, The Rule of Law and Its Promotion Abroad: Three Problems of Scope, 45 STAN. J.
INT'L L. 51 (2009) (discussing the intellectual history of rule of law movements and various
critiques that challenge the legitimacy of rule of law initiatives).
144. See id. at 101-14 (discussing different methods for promoting the rule of law, in-
cluding: (1) coercive imposition and neo-trusteeship, (2) punitive and positive external
incentives, (3) international democratic socialization, and (4) demonstration and emulation).
These sorts of methods are generally directed toward developing nations at the behest of high-
ly developed nations or their institutions (such as the World Bank or the International
Monetary Fund).
145. Id. at 105-06; see also supra note 107 (noting that Nicaragua complied with the
IACtHR's judgment after compliance was conditioned upon the receipt of a World Bank
loan).
146. Magen, supra note 143, at 105 (noting, however, that "the number of international
actors able and willing to deploy this type of external pressure has been very small").
147. Id.
148. In the end, however, implementing judgments might simply be a matter of national
political will and social norms, which may be more difficult to change though incentive-based
policies. See, e.g., Stop that Hunting; Botswana's Bushmen, ECONOMIST, Aug. 8, 2009, at 44
(noting that political will to allow the Bushmen (or San) to live independently on their own
land conflicts with political norms on inclusion and diversity).
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analysis of repeat players and one-shotters to explain how Article 28's
requirement of just, fair, and equitable compensation may not necessar-
ily benefit indigenous peoples in the litigation process. Part H explained,
by reference to the Richtersveld and Awas Iingni cases, that even suc-
cessfully litigated claims can suffer from the difficulty of obtaining a
just, fair, and equitable remedy. Part II proposed several ways to help
indigenous peoples break through the repeat player/one-shotter paradigm
to obtain this meaningful remedy.
